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Abstract
The ﬁnancial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis that it precipitated in a number of
peripheral EU Member States heralded massive changes in insolvency, corporate
rescue and employment protection policies. The US and the EU both suffered
greatly in the wake of the crisis, but their recoveries have occurred along very dif-
ferent tracks. The US has managed to regain much of its position in terms of rel-
ative growth and the UK has outpaced the recoveries of those European countries
that are members of the European Monetary Union. The purpose of this treatise is
to explore the context of the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis in the US and in the EU
and its impact on legal reform in corporate rescue and restructuring as well as
those aspects of social policy implicated within insolvency systems (notably collec-
tive redundancy and transfers of undertakings). It will also consider whether or
not the corporate rescue and employee protection systems can be seen to be con-
verging, and whether, in view of the different socio-economic, political and cultural
aspects of the US and the EU, such convergence might be beneﬁcial.
I. Introduction
It is a different world since the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007. Where there
was once an emphasis on the protection and creation of workers’ rights in many na-
tions, particularly within the European Union,2 these are now being tempered by
*Email: JenniferL.L.Gant@gmail.com
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pressing ﬁnancial issues of sovereign debt, weakened national economies and soar-
ing deﬁcits. Not every country experienced the ﬁnancial crisis in the same way. This
is due in part to their position in their economic cycles prior to the crisis, the funda-
mental strength of national economies preceding the crisis, the effects of member-
ship of the European Monetary Union3 and the spending habits of governments
and consumers. The United States4 and the EU have fared differently, while indi-
vidual EU Member States provide interesting examples of the diverse range of im-
pact that the ﬁnancial crisis has had throughout the western world.
The ﬁnancial crisis had a pervasive impact on the real economy of the EU. 5
Nearly all high income countries suffered an increase in debt during the recession
that followed. One of the fundamental differences between EU and US economies
is the fact that although the EU Member States are bound by a common currency,
they are not constrained by a common ﬁscal policy. Thus debt ratios and budget
deﬁcits vary signiﬁcantly across all EU Member States, despite the ﬁscal restric-
tions contained in the EU Treaties.6 The extent to which the ﬁnancial crisis af-
fected individual Member States depended on their initial economic and
regulatory conditions and vulnerabilities, often associated with the initial and on-
going effects of joining the EMU.7
Since the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis there have been massive changes in
national approaches to the regulation of aspects of national and supranational
economies and social policies. This is particularly evident in the changes that have
occurred throughout the EU in its reduced emphasis on social protections, in fa-
vour instead of a more neo-liberal approach designed to support its weakened eco-
nomic status. Member State reforms under these revised EU policies as well as the
austerity measures required in those States that are party to Memoranda of Un-
derstanding8 in return for ﬁnancial support have seen the steady erosion of
workers’ rights generally, while the “rescue culture”9 has been steadily infused into
Member State legal systems. While the presence of good rescue mechanisms may
mitigate to some extent the loss of social protection, it is questionable whether or
not such reforms are capable of going far enough to protect the most vulnerable
of those EU citizens affected by the ﬁnancial crisis.
The US and the EU are often seen to conﬂict in their approach to social policy
issues, although the US also presents an often emulated rescue regime in Chapter
11 of the US Bankruptcy Code.10 Both the EU and the US have been signiﬁcantly
affected by the ﬁnancial crisis, but the US has been able to recover more quickly
3. Hereafter referred to as the “EMU”.
4. Hereafter referred to as the “US”.
5. Commonly referred to as PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ire-
land, Greece and Spain); for the purpose of this paper,
they will be referred to as the GIIPS.
6. T Grennes, “Diminishing Quality of Fiscal Institutions
in the US and the EU” (2013) 33(1) Cato J 91, 101.
7. “Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences
and Responses” (2009) 7 European Economy – Economic
and Financial Affairs 8-10, 20–27.
8. Hereafter referred to as “MoU”.
9. An economic policy emphasising the priority of re-
habilitating viable companies in ﬁnancial distress for
the purposes of preserving their economic value as well
as the livelihood and well being of those dependent
upon an enterprise, including unsecured creditors, em-
ployees, communities and other stakeholders.
10. An Act to Establish a Uniform Law on the Subject of
Bankruptcies enacted by the 95th United States Congress
Pub L 95-598, 92 Stat 2549 of November 6 1978.
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and, it could be argued, more effectively than has the EU, although individual EU
Member States have varied in their survival and recovery. The question is, then,
whether the EU can learn anything from the US handling of the ﬁnancial crisis,
and in particular its approach to social policy and the effectiveness of its corporate
rescue regime. Given the shift in economic and social policy within the EU and its
effects on the Member States, has there also been some form of convergence the
EU and the US as there has been to some extent among the Member States of
the EU? The purpose of this treatise is to explore the context of the 2007–2008 ﬁ-
nancial crisis in the US and in the EU, its impact on legal reform in corporate res-
cue and restructuring and those aspects of social policy implicated within
insolvency systems (notably collective redundancy and transfers of undertakings),
whether or not the corporate rescue and employee protection systems can be seen
to be converging, in view of the different socio-economic, political and cultural as-
pects of the US and the EU, such convergence might be beneﬁcial or, indeed,
possible.
A. The EU conundrum: social policy and corporate rescue
Social policy refers to the provision of services, income and protection for vulner-
able or unfortunate citizens who are unable to support or protect themselves. The
basis for social policies stems from human rights protected by the EU and national
court systems and the social ills they are aimed to resolve. Although the back-
ground to social policy is universal, the level and form of investment in these mat-
ters vary.11 Until relatively recently, social policy was viewed as a poor relation in
the process of European integration. The Treaty of Rome12 merely exhorted the
Member States to improve working conditions and standard of living for workers
without actually conferring any rights on the workers themselves. The initial view
was that economic integration itself would ensure an optimum social system
through the removal of obstacles to free movement. The Ohlin13 and Spaak14 re-
ports upon which the social policy aspects of the Treaty of Rome were based
rejected the idea of trying to harmonise social policy within the European Commu-
nity15 because it was thought that as higher costs tend to accompany higher pro-
ductivity, the differences between countries were not as great as they appeared.16
In the early days of the EC, the absence of a clearly identiﬁable social policy can
be explained by the fact that social policy and labour law lay at the heart of the
11. P Kettunen and C Wolff, “Europeanisation through
the Back Door: EU Social Policy and theMember States”
(2010) 47(5) Politicka misao 144, 146.
12. The Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC) (1957).
13. “Social Aspects of European Economic Co-Opera-
tion: Report by a Group of Experts, Studies and Reports,
New Series, No. 46 (Geneva 1956). The ﬁndings of the
experts were summarised in “Social Aspects of European
Economic Co-Operation” (1956) 74(2) Int’l Lab Rev 99.
14. “The Brussels Report on the General Common
Market” published by the Information Service High
Authority of the European Community for Coal and
Steel, Luxembourg June 1956.
15. Hereafter referred to as the “EC”.
16. See A Philip, “Social Aspects of European Eco-
nomic Co-Operation” (1957) 76 Int’l Lab Rev 144
and C Brewster and P Teague, European Community So-
cial Policy and its Impact on the UK (Institute of Personnel
Management 1989) 52.
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sovereignty of Member States and was viewed as a means of preserving national
integrity and political stability.17 If national markets had remained closed and in-
dependent, social policy could continue as a domestic concern; however, once
the EC had created the Common Market with a common currency, social policy
in one country became relevant to other states as it affects the integrity of the cur-
rency and competitiveness within the Common Market.18After decades of slow but
progressive changes to employment rights and protections within the EU, all
Member States are now bound by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights19 and
the Social Chapter of the EU Treaty,20 with some narrow derogative options.21
However, EU social policy remains within the domain of Member States to deter-
mine, requiring unanimous decision making in legislative proposals falling under
its deﬁnition.22 As social institutions are deeply embedded in each country’s larger
societal framework and history, they cannot be easily aligned23 as will be seen by
the diverse ways in which social policy related directives are implemented in Mem-
ber States.
The approach to social policy differs signiﬁcantly from the more closely coordi-
nated action taken the EU in matters of insolvency. The cooperation of European
countries in matters of insolvency has a long history. The project has been in prog-
ress for over 40 years within the EU, evolving in complexity and increasing in co-
operation as the EU has expanded and changed.24 The culmination of this
cooperation was the EU Insolvency Regulation,25 which deals with the coordina-
tion of cross-border insolvency between Member States. While this does not imple-
ment an EU wide insolvency system, the aims and outcomes of corporate rescue
mechanisms throughout the EU do not have the same variance that social policy
regulation does. This could be explained by the fact that insolvency, as a corporate
law matter, has a more international inf luence given the globalised marketplace in
which most businesses now exist. A closer alignment of insolvency mechanisms is
logical, therefore, as it makes cross-border business less complicated. This may also
explain the EU approach to a cross-border insolvency regulation, rather than try-
ing to implement an EU wide insolvency system. There is perhaps a more natural
tendency to align systems that are forced to interact regularly in the common and
international markets.26
17. W Streeck, “Neo-Voluntarism: a New European
Social Policy Regime?”(1995) 1 ELJ 31, 31.
18. D Trubek and L Trubek, “Hard and Soft law in
the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the
Open Method of Coordination”(2005) 11(3) ELJ
343, 345.
19. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union OJ 2000/C 364/1 of 18 December 2000.
20. The Treaty on European Union OJ C/191/01of
29 July 1992 (the Maastricht Treaty).
21. The Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the provi-
sions of the Social Chapter directly in 1997.
22. N Esenturk, “EU Social Policy: Progressive Devel-
opment in Legal and Governance Aspects” (2010) UK
Social Policy Association <http://www.social-policy.
org.uk/lincoln/Esenturk.pdf> accessed 17 November
2012, 2–3.
23. Kettunen and Wolff (n11) 148.
24. P Omar, European Insolvency Law (Ashgate 2004) 49.
25. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29
May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings (OJ 2000/
L160/1) (hereafter referred to as the “EIR”).
26. See M Siems, “Shareholder, Creditor and Worker
Protection: Time Series Evidence about the Differences
between French, German, Indian, UK and US Law”
(2012) Centre for Business Research, University of
Cambridge, Working Paper No 381 <http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1329997>
accessed September 2013.
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This same idea can explain to a certain extent why it is that Member State em-
ployment and labour regulations have not seen the same kind of convergence or
direct regulation by the EU. Workers are generally less mobile with the conse-
quence that differences in preferences can lead to differences in labour law systems.
Also, the political context of business versus labour is speciﬁcally a domestic con-
cern; as such, the conﬂicting pressure may steer different countries in different di-
rections.27 This also offers justiﬁcation for legislating in this area with directives,
which are binding only as to the result to be achieved. There are a number of di-
rectives under EU Law that serve to further preserve employment and workers’
rights in insolvency situations in relation to collective redundancies, 28 transfers
of undertakings29 and state guarantee funds for employee wages and other com-
pensation.30 Member States have taken varied approaches to the implementation
of these directives31 as derogations are available that have been implemented dif-
ferently among the Member States owing to the endogenous factors of culture, le-
gal tradition and domestic social policy.32 While social policy directives and their
implementation among Member States provide a minimum level of protection
for employees affected by their employer’s insolvency, they have not prevented
the massive issues of unemployment and precarious job security that has accompa-
nied the ﬁnancial crisis in the EU.
B. The ﬁnancial and sovereign debt crisis in the EU
There has been a marked difference in the effects and responses to the ﬁnancial crisis
between the GIIPS or peripheral EU Member States and the central core of the
north western EU Member States.33 The latter of these had been on a campaign
of market ﬂexibilisation since the creation of the EMU, while the former countries
have tended to lag behind in their social reforms, although most also began from
a different point in the modernity of their individual national economies. 34 While
the launching of the Euro was met with hope that it would create a wave of compet-
itive, supply-side reforms across the EU, not every country succeeded in
27. M Siems (n26) 20–21.
28. Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on
the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to collective redundancies, OJ L 255 provides
standards to be used when an employer is contemplat-
ing collective dismissals which must be applied in a sit-
uation that involves dismissing 20 employees over a
period of 90 days or the lesser of 10% or 30 employees
over 30 days.
29. Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the
event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of
undertakings or businesses, OJ L 82—provides for spe-
ciﬁc protections for employees subject to business
transfers requiring the transfer of their employment
contracts with continuity of employment, but allows
for speciﬁc derogations in insolvency situations.
30. Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 Octover
1980 on the approximation of the laws of hte Mem-
ber States relating to the protection of employees in
the event of the insolvency of their employer, OJ L
283.
31. Ius Laboris, Collective Redundancy Guide (2009)
<http://www.iuslaboris.com/ﬁles/documents/Public
%20Files/Publications/2009_Publications/collective-
redundancies-guide.pdf> ﬁrst accessed 2013.
32. Ius Laboris, Guide on Transfer of Undertakings,
available from http://www.iuslaboris.com/ﬁles/docu-
ments/Public%20Files/Publications/2008_Publica-
tions/transfers-of-undertaking.pdf ﬁrst accessed 2012.
33. France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
34. “Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences
and Responses” (2009) 7 European Economy – Eco-
nomic and Financial Affairs 8–10, 20-22.
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implementing long-lasting reforms that would help them to cope better with the dis-
cipline of living within a single currency. Fiscal convergence criteria for the Euro
chieﬂy had to do with controlling inﬂation and government debt.35 The GIIPS
countries made strenuous efforts to qualify for the Euro by reducing public spending
and holding down wages and other costs, but these provisions were often relaxed
once they were admitted to the EMU.36 In addition, the fact that while they are
joined within a common monetary union, EU Member States are not joined under
a single ﬁscal policy exerting stewardship over their economies has led to diverse ap-
proaches in dealing with the economic problems caused by the crisis.37
The issues dividing the GIIPS and core EU countries in the effects that the ﬁ-
nancial crisis has had on their individual economies can be traced in part back
to the creation of the EMU. The decision to enter into a common currency, while
in principle strictly ﬁnancial, had huge political and social implications as it pro-
vided an unprecedented connection between the economic destinies of European
nations who had relinquished one of the most fundamental functions of sover-
eignty: the control of their own currency and monetary policy.38 While the Euro
provides considerable economic and political beneﬁts to core countries by making
it impossible to undercut exports with currency depreciation, many GIIPS coun-
tries have lost a considerable portion of their market share that had once been
greater when the lower cost of production systems allowed for lower prices in ex-
port. This led to trade deﬁcits that have contributed in part to the sovereign debt
crisis,39 which is not, therefore, merely a debt crisis, but a competitiveness and
growth crisis resulting from structural imbalances within the EMU.40
Because of being a part of the EMU, the GIIPS countries could not address
their mounting problems by devaluing their currency or through inﬂation.41 With
no recourse to these ﬁscal policy options, the Euro became a straightjacket for
those members struggling with sovereign debt and to comply with EU ﬁscal re-
quirements.42 The resulting crisis has led to the enactment of austerity measures
carried out by all of the GIIPS countries, in particular those subject to so-called
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), a new instrument that departs from any
EU instruments agreed to the open method of coordination or other hard legisla-
tion. These MoUs contain the conditions of the ﬁnancial support of the European
Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund.43
35. JACaporaso andMin-HyungKim, “TheMaastricht
Treaty at Twenty: A Greco-European Tragedy?” (2012)
34(7) Eur Integration 769, 778.
36. “The European Central Bank: Ten Years on, Be-
ware the Porcine Plot” (2008) June 5th The Econo-
mist <http://www.economist.com/node/11496844>
accessed 14 August 2014.
37. J Gokhale and E Partin, “Europe and the US: On
the Fiscal Brink?” (2013) 33(2) Cato J 193, 193.
38. F Pavoncello, “One for All, All for One: The Euro
in Crisis” (2011) May/June World Affairs 59, 62.
39. C Hadjmichalis, “Uneven Geographical Develop-
ment and Socio Spatial Justice and Solidarity:
European Regions after the 2009 Financial Crisis”
(2011) 18 Eur Urban and Regional Studies 254, 259-264.
40. B Moro, “Lessons from the European Economic
and Financial Great Crisis: A Survey” (2014) 34 Eur
J Political Economy S9-S24,
41. K Armingeou and L Baccaro, “Political Economy
of the Sovereign Debt Crisis: the Limits of Internal De-
valuation” (2012) 41(3) ILJ 254, 255-256 & 263–265.
42. F Pavoncello (n38) 65.
43. The “troika”.
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MoUs have essentially replaced the EU recommendations that generally
emerge through the economic policy coordination process.44 They are essentially
reactive in nature, as a means of saving ailing economies and protecting the EU
from the effects of sovereign debt default.45 The introduction of austerity measures
has forced the GIIPS countries to begin a process of forced convergence, bringing
them into closer alignment with the UK and Germany, although France continues
to maintain its own unique social contract. The effects of the austerity measures
taken under the MoUs, the stagnation, slow recovery and high national debts have
resulted in a spectrum of reforms in economic and social policy areas, including in-
solvency, corporate rescue and the treatment of workers affected by an employer’s
insolvency. The same has not occurred in the US, but it does provide an interesting
model of comparison in the context of the crisis and responses to it.
C. Born in the USA: American social policy and chapter 11
Before examining social and economic policy within the US, certain constitutional
and governmental structures must be understood. Like the EU under the Treaties,
the federal government of the US is limited by certain enumerated powers listed in
the Constitution. The Constitution enshrines the concept of federalism by espous-
ing certain political and social values that promote the diffusion of power that re-
duces the perceived risk of tyrannical federal control.46 The importance of
federalism is a fundamental characteristic of the US political system and has given
the US Constitution an extraordinarily high status in the hierarchy of legal institu-
tions, particularly when compared to other constitutional democracies or to the
new breed of constitutional federalism characterised by the EU political structure
and institutions.
The enumerated powers of the Constitution include seven original articles and
twenty seven amendments. Bankruptcy is covered expressly under the Constitu-
tion as a power of the federal government;47 however, contract law and other do-
mestic state concerns are not. While certain rights are now guaranteed for
employees in the US, these rights do not derive from any speciﬁc constitutional
article or amendment implementing social policy objectives on a federal level.
Rather, they derive from various articles and amendments to the Constitution that
has been used to justify their existence. Notably, employee rights such as mini-
mum wage, working hours, health and safety, equal pay and even civil rights issues
such as afﬁrmative action48 have been justiﬁed as being covered by the Commerce
44. K A Armstrong, “New Governance and EU Fiscal
Discipline” (2013) 38(5) E L Rev 601, 606–607.
45. F Pavoncello (n38) 68 and B Eichengreen, “The
Euro’s Never-Ending Crisis” (2011) March Current
History 91.
46.MH Redish, “Doing it with Mirrors: New York v. US
and Constitutional Limitations on Federal Power to
Require State Legislation” (1993) 21 Hastings Const L
Q 593, 604.
47. Article 1 Section 8 Clause 4 states that Congresses
enumerated powers include the power to establish a
uniform rule of naturalisation and uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies throughout the US.
48. Although the groundwork for these were laid by the
13th amendment abolishing slavery, the 15th amendment
prohibiting discrimination in the right to vote based on
race and the 15th amendment giving women the right
to vote laid the groundwork for these laws.
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Clause,49 which allows the federal government to regulate business conducted
across state lines. There is also a “necessary and proper” clause providing Con-
gress with a signiﬁcant degree of ﬂexibility in the invocation of its enumerated
powers, although this ﬂexibility has been continuously mitigated by a focus on
the limitations on the federal government set out with some speciﬁcity in the Con-
stitution.50 The context of US social policy differs signiﬁcantly from EU social pol-
icy that ﬁgures quite prominently in most Member States through the
implementation of social policy directives having legal basis set out in the Social
Chapter of the EU Treaty, unlike the lack of speciﬁc social policy considerations
in the US Constitution.
I. American social policy, employment and labour regulation
The American labour and employment system is characterised by the concept of
“at-will” employment in which employers possessed the legal authority to deter-
mine unilaterally the terms and conditions of an employment relationship. This
imbalance between employer and employee is tempered to some extent by the
beneﬁts of union membership through which employers and unions can set the
terms and conditions of employment. However the union sector comprises only
about 11.3% of the current labour market.51 Since peaking at 34.7% in 1954,
the decline has been attributed to a variety of factors, such as the globalised econ-
omy that has reduced union power to create and keep a monopoly within product
markets; changes in the composition of the workforce; the increase in contingent
work instead of a concentrated core worker system characterised by long-term em-
ployment relationships; deﬁciency of union regulation; employer opposition to
unions; and the nature of American unionism and its roots in pragmatism rather
than politics. Unionism never rose to the heights that it achieved in other
industrialised countries, which might be traced in part to the individualistic char-
acter of the American psyche.52
While, broadly speaking, the “at-will” rule is still in place, a number of statutes
have also been enacted that place limitations on this doctrine. In the mid 1960s,
union regulation53 and minimum wage and working time regulations54 were
joined by a number of anti-discrimination and other statutes intended to set min-
imum workplace requirements.55 Prior to the millennium, there were also a num-
ber of judicially led limitations placed on the “at-will” rule in several American
49. Article 1 Section 8 of the Preamble to the US
Constitution
50. MH Redish (n46) 604.
51. Bureau of Labor Statistics Economic News Re-
lease: Union Members Summary (January 2014) avail-
able from http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.
nr0.htm accessed 29 October 2014.
52. SF Befort, “Labour and Employment Law at the
Millennium: a Historical Review and Critical Assess-
ment” (2001) 43 B C L Rev 460, 355-375.
53. Notably the National Labour Relations Act 1935,
which obligated employers to negotiate with freely se-
lected union representatives of their employees.
54. The Fair Labour Standards Act 29 U.S.C ss201–
209 (1994) mandating the forty hour work week and
the minimum wage.
55. See for example The Civil Rights Act 1964, Americans
with Disabilities Act 1990, Genetic Information and
Non-Discrimination Act 2008.
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states. Most jurisdictions permit a public policy tort action that allows an employee
to claim that a dismissal or discharge decision offends public policy, generally bar-
ring employers from dismissing employees for refusing to perform an unlawful act,
exercising statutory rights or who report an employer’s unlawful conduct.56 Con-
tract claims are also generally an exception to the “at-will” rule because of the im-
plication of certain contractual obligations such as job security or disciplinary
procedures, whether from an oral covenant or in an employee handbook where
such agreements are in place. Further, some jurisdictional courts have implied cov-
enants of good faith and fair dealing, requiring each party to refrain from acting in
bad faith in a way that frustrates the others’ expectations of the employment
relationship.57
The reasons for the introduction of legislation limiting the “at-will” doctrine
have been placed at the feet of the changing nature of the workplace in which
the doctrine is at odds with the realities of contemporary employment relation-
ships. Also, there was a recognised need to implement some labour protection be-
cause of the signiﬁcant decline in union membership and power. These
contemporary employment relationships are characterised by increasingly large
corporate employers as well as specialised job functions that have made mobility
within the labour market less realistic. In addition, advances in trade and technol-
ogy have further tipped the balance of power toward employers, particularly in
view of the need for employers to compete on the world market, leading to a “race
to the bottom” of employment rights. The lack of any regime for protecting em-
ployees from unfair dismissals further exacerbates this problem as workers are
not protected from whimsical dismissal unless it is based on the protected charac-
teristics of discrimination legislation or if it occurs within one of those jurisdictions
where the courts have limited the application of the “at-will” doctrine.58
There are limited protections available to employees affected by an employer’s
insolvency. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notiﬁcation Act,59 essentially
a statute requiring advance notice if collective redundancies were envisaged, was
passed to mitigate some of the issues surrounding large scale bankruptcies. This
act does not require consultation as does the EU’s Collective Redundancies Direc-
tive, merely 60days advance notice in employers having over 100 employees, al-
though it excludes several categories of workers, including those engaging in
collective action at the time of the notice.60
The labour side of labour and employment law in the USA is predicated on the
belief that employees have the right to organise, to bargain collectively and to en-
gage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection as set out in the National
56. Known as “whistle-blowing” in the UK which as a
reason for discharge is now prohibited in a number of
American states.
57. S F Befort (n52) 378-383.
58. Ibid, 385–393.
59. An Act to require advance notiﬁcation of plant
closings and mass layoffs, and for other purposes (the
“WARN” Act) enacted by the 100th United States
Congress, Pub. L. 100-379 102 Stat 890.
60. Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on
the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to collective redundancies.
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Labour Relations Act.61 It has also been recognised that employees have the right
not to engage in any of these collective activities. This area of American social pol-
icy with regard to employees is relatively coherent and efﬁcient. However, the em-
ployment side not governed by union regulation is not so structured. The aims of
employment regulation have no philosophical basis or foundational principal, un-
like all of the employment protection regimes throughout the EU, although indi-
vidual Member States vary on what those foundational principals are. Further,
there are signiﬁcant jurisdictional issues when it comes to bringing claims challeng-
ing an employee’s discharge, including the number of claims available and the
number of forums within which they might be heard. Those employees protected
by collective agreements may have the opportunity of bringing a civil claim in ad-
dition to a claim under labour arbitration, thus allowing “two bites of the apple”.
The confusion in the system causes great expense and lawsuits often take years to
resolve. This precludes the less wealthy from trying to attain justice in any event.
While a Model Employment Termination Act was introduced in 1991 that gov-
erns issues of employment security and unfair discharges, it has yet to be adopted
by any state apart from Delaware.62 Thus it can be questioned whether the current
state of affairs in US labour and employment law is an efﬁcient means of attaining
justice for employees, employers or as a legal regime that that ﬁts within a modern
economy. This is not helped by the lack of federal power to control social policy in
this area in any fundamental way because of the fact that contract law, of which
employment law is a subset, is governed by individual state legal systems. Given
the ﬁnancial crisis and the restructurings ensuing from it, the treatment of em-
ployees in corporate rescue situations is also of great interest.
2. Chapter 11 and employee entitlements
Chapter 11 provides for the US’ upstream corporate rescue procedure and was ﬁrst
introduced in the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Its aim was to push managers of ﬁnan-
cially troubled ﬁrms toward reorganisation rather than succumbing to liquidation.
The United States Congress believed that assets would be better utilised in the indus-
try with which they were associated, rather than being scrapped and sold off for parts
to random buyers.63 Congress also stated that it is more economically efﬁcient to
reorganise than to liquidate because it preserves jobs and assets.64 The Bankruptcy
Reform Act recognised the costs on various stakeholders to a bankrupt company, in-
cluding creditors, employees, suppliers, customers and communities and concluded
that an alternative to a court supervised reorganisation was required to protect busi-
nesses from ultimate failure, thereby protecting the associated stakeholders and
61. An act to diminish the causes of labour disputes
burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign com-
merce, to create a National Labor Relations Board,
and for other purposes (the “NLRA” or Wagner Act)
enacted by the 74th United States Congress on July 6
1935, Pub. L. 74–198, 49 Stat. 449.
62. S F Befort (n52) 396-424.
63. M Bradley and M Rosenzweig, “The Untenable
Case for Chapter 11” (1992) 101(5) Yale L J 1043,
1043-1044.
64. See HR Rep No 595, 95th Cong 1st Sess. 220 (1977)
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and, it could be argued, more effectively than has the EU, although individual EU
Member States have varied in their survival and recovery. The question is, then,
whether the EU can learn anything from the US handling of the ﬁnancial crisis,
and in particular its approach to social policy and the effectiveness of its corporate
rescue regime. Given the shift in economic and social policy within the EU and its
effects on the Member States, has there also been some form of convergence the
EU and the US as there has been to some extent among the Member States of
the EU? The purpose of this treatise is to explore the context of the 2007–2008 ﬁ-
nancial crisis in the US and in the EU, its impact on legal reform in corporate res-
cue and restructuring and those aspects of social policy implicated within
insolvency systems (notably collective redundancy and transfers of undertakings),
whether or not the corporate rescue and employee protection systems can be seen
to be converging, in view of the different socio-economic, political and cultural as-
pects of the US and the EU, such convergence might be beneﬁcial or, indeed,
possible.
A. The EU conundrum: social policy and corporate rescue
Social policy refers to the provision of services, income and protection for vulner-
able or unfortunate citizens who are unable to support or protect themselves. The
basis for social policies stems from human rights protected by the EU and national
court systems and the social ills they are aimed to resolve. Although the back-
ground to social policy is universal, the level and form of investment in these mat-
ters vary.11 Until relatively recently, social policy was viewed as a poor relation in
the process of European integration. The Treaty of Rome12 merely exhorted the
Member States to improve working conditions and standard of living for workers
without actually conferring any rights on the workers themselves. The initial view
was that economic integration itself would ensure an optimum social system
through the removal of obstacles to free movement. The Ohlin13 and Spaak14 re-
ports upon which the social policy aspects of the Treaty of Rome were based
rejected the idea of trying to harmonise social policy within the European Commu-
nity15 because it was thought that as higher costs tend to accompany higher pro-
ductivity, the differences between countries were not as great as they appeared.16
In the early days of the EC, the absence of a clearly identiﬁable social policy can
be explained by the fact that social policy and labour law lay at the heart of the
11. P Kettunen and C Wolff, “Europeanisation through
the Back Door: EU Social Policy and theMember States”
(2010) 47(5) Politicka misao 144, 146.
12. The Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC) (1957).
13. “Social Aspects of European Economic Co-Opera-
tion: Report by a Group of Experts, Studies and Reports,
New Series, No. 46 (Geneva 1956). The ﬁndings of the
experts were summarised in “Social Aspects of European
Economic Co-Operation” (1956) 74(2) Int’l Lab Rev 99.
14. “The Brussels Report on the General Common
Market” published by the Information Service High
Authority of the European Community for Coal and
Steel, Luxembourg June 1956.
15. Hereafter referred to as the “EC”.
16. See A Philip, “Social Aspects of European Eco-
nomic Co-Operation” (1957) 76 Int’l Lab Rev 144
and C Brewster and P Teague, European Community So-
cial Policy and its Impact on the UK (Institute of Personnel
Management 1989) 52.
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employment will be “at-will” and subject to whatever provides the greatest beneﬁt
for the employer company’s circumstances at the time.71
Employee claims occurring prior to the petition for Chapter 11 rank fourth in
priority under the US Bankruptcy Code. However, these are limited to claims of
direct compensation in wages, salaries and commissions that have been earned
at the time of the petition but not yet paid in the 180days prior to the ﬁling for
bankruptcy and are limited in the amount claimable. This also applies to pension
and welfare beneﬁt claims arising under a pre-established plan.72 These rank
equally to and combine under the limitations applied to wages and salaries. While
true that these claims carry priority, this is only after administrative expenses and
secured claims have been paid. Certain damages claims might also rank with pri-
ority, although this is only if the relevant employment contracts have been as-
sumed, in the absence of which the debtor will have no obligation to pay
damages immediately upon breach.73
Following the petition for bankruptcy, those employees that have been assumed
by the debtor are assured of being paid for services rendered during the
reorganisation. These rank as an administrative expense and are given ﬁrst prior-
ity, although it is rare that such a claim will arise as a debtor will be sure to con-
tinue to pay such administrative debts as they fall due or risk not completing
reorganisation. 74 In any event, while priority exists, it falls short of the priority
given to employees in similar situations in EU countries as employees with pre-pe-
tition claims essentially rank equally with unsecured creditors and are limited in
time and amount claimable.
In terms of the employment protection regulation available to employees during
the insolvency of their employer, the “at-will” doctrine continues to apply. An em-
ployee does not have the right to be transferred with a business to which he is as-
sociated and if he is, there is no continuity of employment between the previous
employer and the new one. Essentially, this relies on basic laws of contract that
once governed the whole of employment law in the United Kingdom, although
this is now mitigated by employment protection regulation aimed at correcting
the power imbalance in the employment relationship. There are no statutory no-
tice periods, requirements for severance or redundancy pay, or procedural re-
quirements for dismissal. For any of these to apply, they would have to be
included in a collective agreement or perhaps an employee handbook. Employers
can lay-off employees for any reason that does not violate anti-discrimination stat-
utes or that constitute an act of bad faith. The only mitigation here is the WARN
Act, which requires notiﬁcation of a mass layoff or plant closure under speciﬁc
71. Ibid., 6–12.
72. Pensions refers only to retirement income while wel-
fare beneﬁts refer to medical, health, accident, disability
or death beneﬁts, severance pay, training, apprenticeship
programmes, day care and prepaid legal services.
73. PM Secunda, “An Analysis of the Treatment of
Employee Pension and Wage Claims in Insolvency
and Under Guarantee Schemes in OECD Countries:
Comparative Law Lessons for Detroit and the US”
(2014) XLI Fordham Urban Law Journal 867, 898 and
DR Korobkin (n70) 8-9.
74. DR Korobkin (n70) 14-15.
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circumstances as described above.75 The crisis has done little to inspire reforms in
the treatment of employees affected by an employer’s insolvency in the US, al-
though the EU and Member States have proceeded with reforms in this area in
a number of ways, both positive and negative.
D. Corporate rescue and worker protection in the context of crisis in the EU
At the start of the crisis, public authorities and national legislatures took a range of
measures to boost enterprise ﬂexibility that included amendments to national la-
bour law. While some countries proceeded with ﬂexibilising labour regulation with
a view toward its modernisation, a number of countries were forced into this posi-
tion because of austerity measures contained in MoUs that inevitably required sub-
stantial changes to labour as well as banking regulation and in some cases
corporate rescue systems in order to reduce the risks associated with their per-
ceived economically ineffective regimes.76 Workers’ rights have now been reduced
throughout the EU in a number of areas, including those areas associated with in-
solvency and ﬁnancial difﬁculty such as collective redundancies, hours of work and
general revisions to rules on employment protection.77 It is interesting to note,
however, that few of these reforms have been instigated through normal legislative
channels, but under the reactive MoUs and through political pressure.
There are a number of responses taken to the ﬁnancial and debt crisis that vary
from Member State to Member State in terms of both supporting the rescue cul-
ture and reforming the labour market. There were a number of reforms to corpo-
rate rescue regimes throughout the EU in the early 21st century, and then just
following the ﬁnancial crisis, with the aim of supporting a rescue culture, although
a number of jurisdictions have found themselves at different depths along the
stream of rehabilitation and recovery. These regimes have operated with varied
success as an effective embankment for the protection of failing businesses and
the social and economic welfare associated with them in terms of the range of em-
ployee entitlements available under corporate rescue procedures and those other
legislative factors that provide protection from within labour and employment
law. These varied responses are indicative of the differing context in which domes-
tic social policies have evolved and may also show how difﬁcult it may be to force
further alignment to achieve better cross-border cooperation.
3. Germany
Germany held a very different position within the EU than any of the Member
States at the time that the Euro was adopted. European integration has beneﬁtted
75. PA Susser (n69).
76. S Clauwaert and I Schomann, “The Crisis and Na-
tional Labour Law Reforms” (2012) Working Paper
2012.04 European Trade Union Institute 5–6.
77. D Tajgman and others, “Rights at Work in
Times of Crisis: Trends at the Country Level in
Terms of Compliance with International Labour
Standards” (2011) International Labour Ofﬁce Em-
ployment Sector Employment Working Paper No.
101, 1–2, 5–6.
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Germany and has effectively increased its power. However, it is generally at odds
with other Member States in terms of its ﬁscal and economic policy preferences to
stimulate growth. German competition in the EU market is rooted in the suppres-
sion of wage increases and to a rise in more precarious employment conditions, a
situation that is now evident in the austerity being applied in the GIIPS countries.
In terms of its social policy regarding employment protection, there were a number
of changes to German welfare in the early 2000s. Germany now has a growing
number of young employees working for low pay often without beneﬁts. Its rules
on maternity and support for parents effectively discourages many qualiﬁed work-
ing women from pursuing successful careers after becoming mothers as the condi-
tions are not conducive to a reasonable work-life balance.78 Following the ﬁnancial
crisis, the Kurzarbeit79 was introduced in which the state paid up to 70% of a per-
son’s salary up to a cap, workers took a cut in hours and pay while in return the
employer agreed not to lay off the worker. This short-time working scheme kept
German employment ﬁgures inﬂated in contrast to the falling levels of employ-
ment elsewhere in the EU. It is believed, however, that this scheme allowed many
businesses to survive the sharp decline in orders because of the collapse in interna-
tional trade in 2009 and to then expand capacity quite quickly during the rebound
period of 2010 and 2011.80
Germany’s insolvency regime has not historically prioritised corporate rescue
over liquidation and is comprised of a unitary insolvency proceeding that may
have any number of outcomes, including the rescue of the company. There is no
normative hierarchy of outcomes for an insolvency situation.81 Following the ﬁ-
nancial crisis there have been reforms to German insolvency law in the Act for
the Further Facilitation of the Restructuring of Companies,82 which became effec-
tive in 2012. This Act has provided greater scope and motivation for restructuring
or rescuing a company that the previous unitary procedure did not envisage. It has
also introduced protective shield proceedings,83 which is a pre-insolvency option
that allows a company to develop a restructuring plan as a debtor in possession.84
The German insolvency system does not provide any preferences or priorities for
wage claims or pensions, although there is a wage guarantee fund sourced by em-
ployer premiums and available for the last three months of wages,85 which is
pursuant to the EU Directive requiring such a guarantee fund to be implemented.
In terms of those EU Directives that aim to protect employee job security during
the ﬁnancial trouble of the employer, Germany applies its transfer of undertakings
78. C Lemke, “Challenging the Ever Closer Union:
Political Consequences of the Eurozone Crisis” (2014)
36(1) American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the Na-
tional Committee on American Foreign Policy 18, 21.
79. “Short time working”.
80. M Hallerberg, “Challenges for the German Wel-
fare State Before and After the Global Financial Cri-
sis” (2013) 33(2) Cato J 263, 265-266.
81. M Balz, “Market Conformity of Insolvency Pro-
ceedings: Policy Issues of the German Insolvency
Law” (1997) 23 BrookJ Int’l L 167, 172.
82. Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung derSanierung
von Unternehmen (ESUG, Act Serving the Further
Facilitation of the Reorganization of Enterprises)
XVII/220, C078.
83. Das Schutzschirmverfahren nach § 270b InsO.
84. G Streit and F Burk, “Restructuring and insolvency
in Germany: Overview” (2014) Practical Law Multi Ju-
risdictional Guide 2014/15 Restructuring and Insol-
vency <http://uk.practicallaw.com/2-501-6976> ﬁrst
accessed 29 October 2014.
85. PM Secunda (n73) 957.
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rules even to those transfers occurring out of insolvency situations with a view to
liquidation. There is no entitlement to redundancy pay unless it is provided for
in a Social Plan with a works council, which most companies have by default. Its
collective redundancy regime applies if an employer intends to make 10% or more
than 25 employees redundant over a 30-day period. Consultation obligations are
with works councils in the absence of which there is no obligation to consult at
all. These provisions are quite close to the minimum requirements provided for
in the Directive.
4. France
The French economy was not as severely compromised by the ﬁnancial crisis as
were the UK and Germany. This has been in part attributed to the way in which
France internationalised its banking sector with what has been viewed as a more
diverse approach with a combination of retail investment as well as corporate lend-
ing and investment banking, the latter two being the cause of much of the banking
turmoil that caused the crisis. Although French banks were still heavily engaged in
market-based banking, they were far smaller investors in toxic assets and other
high risk activities.86 Throughout the crisis, soft forms of protectionism and limited
foreign penetration remained features of the French ﬁnancial sector while there
was only an initial and temporary upswing of intervention as a result of the crisis.87
In addition, while the rest of the EU has continually reduced employment entitle-
ments, France has introduced additional protections and assistance for their unem-
ployed88 and has maintained the highest level of protection for temporary workers,
despite an apparent need to deregulate temporary work to increase ﬂexibility in
the labour market to help reduce unemployment rates like the rest of the EU.89
France has not followed the same harsh prescriptions for cutting public expendi-
ture to stimulate growth, preferring to protect its social welfare over reducing bud-
get deﬁcits. 90 In addition, its corporate rescue regime has been well developed for
decades and receives regular attention in reform and adjustment.
France might be considered the inventor of the concept of corporate rescue, be-
ginning in 1967 even prior to the legendary Chapter 11 procedure that many sys-
tems now try to emulate, although these ﬁrst procedures were court led unlike
Chapter 11. There are a number of up-stream options that allow ever greater op-
portunity to intervene early in the period when a business is in ﬁnancial distress.
These procedures have been frequently amended during the period of the ﬁnan-
cial crisis up to as recently as 2014 when a French style of pre-pack was introduced
in the sauvegarde ﬁnancière accélérée.91 The French system appears to have the most
86. D Howarth, “France and the International Finan-
cial Crisis: The Legacy of State Led Finance” (2013)
26(3) Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Adminis-
tration, and Institutions 369, 374 & 377–382.
87. Ibid., 374 & 389.
88. D Clegg, “Labour Market Policy in the Crisis: the
UK in Comparative Perspective” (2010) Volume 18
Number 1 The Policy Press 5-17, 9.
89. T Vlandas, “The Politics of Temporary Work De-
regulation in Europe: Solving the French Puzzle”
(2013) Volume 41 Politics & Society 425-460, 426–417.
90. C Lemke (n78) 21.
91. The “accelerated ﬁnancial preservation”; P Omar,
“A Reform in Search of a Purpose: French Insolvency
Law Changes (Again!)” (2014) 23 International Insolvency
Review 201, at 203, and 206–208.
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advanced, up-stream, pre-insolvency procedures available, perhaps throughout the
whole of the EU. While the frequency of reform in France is great and perhaps,
because of that fact, confusing, it also shows a willingness to change with the time
in such a way as to keep improving the effectiveness of corporate rescue processes.
France’s inherent concern for its workers is also supported by the constant im-
provement of corporate rescue as this inevitably assists in maintaining a higher
level of job security. For example, its transfer of undertakings rules apply to all
business transfers regardless of the circumstances.
In terms of the employee position in insolvency, employees enjoy a general lien
over the employer’s property which stands as a guarantee for six months worth of
wages and compensation in place of wages, although the lien does not enjoy a high
rank in the order of priority. Employees also have access to a guarantee fund for
limited compensation where funds are not readily available to pay employee
claims.92 Employees enjoy a super priority for a limited part of their claim that
ranks above all other claims, including those of secured creditors and also affords
employees the facility to avoid the disruption and delay of the proceedings so that
they can be paid quickly. In the event that redundancies are envisaged, an em-
ployee safeguard plan must be put in place that serves to ensure everything has
been done to prevent the loss of jobs, further indicating the favouritism enjoyed
by employees in France.
In May 2013 France passed a Job Security Bill that introduced a number of re-
forms to their labour code relating to the rules governing collective redundancies,
some affording additional protections to employees. It adopted a law specifying
that in the event that collective redundancies result in the offer of a new post
abroad, remuneration must be equivalent to that paid in France. Further, the
Court of Cassation ruled that contracts terminated by mutual consent for eco-
nomic reasons in the context of a workforce reduction should also be counted
within the number of intended redundancies, thus counting toward the thresholds
of collective redundancies, which may then indicate the requirement for an em-
ployment safeguard plan to be put in place. Termination by mutual agreement
can therefore not be used to circumvent the protections in place for employees sub-
ject to redundancy.93
The new legislation also affords employers a greater choice as to the procedure
they follow when considering collective redundancies in a company of more than
50 employees considering the dismissal of more than 10 within 30days, triggering
a job protection plan. This process was previously quite strict and required time-
consuming and complicated information and consultation exercises with Works
Councils. Employers are now able to negotiate an agreement with a relevant trade
union or to unilaterally implement a “social plan”, which allows employers to de-
part signiﬁcantly from standard requirements governing the number of meetings
92. Fund available from the Association pour la Gestion du
Régime d’Assurance des Créances des Salariés (the “AGS”).
93. A Muller, “Employment Protection Legislation
Tested by the Economic Crisis: A Global Review of
the Regulation of Collective dismissals for Economic
Reasons” (2011) International Labour Ofﬁce, Dia-
logue in Brief No. 3, 8.
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with employee representatives, timetables for dismissals and selection criteria with
the aim of speeding up the collective consultation process. Work councils will also
be deemed to have been consulted even if it fails to respond within a now closed
timeline. Employers are also now permitted to enter into agreements with trade
unions under which employees agree to detrimental changes to their terms and
conditions in return for a commitment by the employer not to implement any re-
dundancies during the term of the agreement.94 Thus, while France has main-
tained a relatively high protective stance, it has also given employers a bit more
ﬂexibility in dealing with their workforce in times of ﬁnancial difﬁculty.
5. United Kingdom
While the UK experienced a sudden economic shock in terms of bankruptcies, de-
crease in consumer demand, drops in gross domestic product growth and an in-
crease in unemployment, it differs from the rest of the EU in several signiﬁcant
ways. It is not part of the EMU; it follows a liberal approach to the economy
and a light touch to any kind of interventionist regulation,95 which was only en-
hanced through deregulation as a result of the economic crisis; and its ﬁnancial
structure is highly internationalised. As a result of this latter characteristic, it was
one of the ﬁrst EU countries to be heavily hit by the global crisis because of its
strong ties with the ﬁnancial sector of the US.96
In terms of social and unemployment problems caused by the ﬁnancial crisis,
Britain took a distinctly laissez-faire approach and has been unwilling to improve,
even temporarily, the already limited support provided in unemployment. It has,
in fact, further eroded unemployment beneﬁts and continued to make it more dif-
ﬁcult for the more vulnerable members of society, while also trying to encourage as
many citizens to return to work. Unfortunately, this latter aim has tended to hit
those who are out of work not for any lack of ambition, but because they are un-
able or incapable of working. Thus, the UK’s approach to tackling the crisis has
been characterised mostly by tax cuts in an attempt to boost economic activity,
while little has been done to address those who are becoming unemployed, differ-
ing signiﬁcantly in approach to the rest of Western Europe.97 In addition, the UK
has proceeded to deregulate the labour market in a number of areas, including dis-
crimination and equality. It has repealed provisions in the Equality Act 2010
94. J-F Gerard, “International Labour Law Bulletin”
Freshﬁelds Bruckhaus Deringer Summer 2013 avail-
able from http://www.freshﬁelds.com/
uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/36343_FINAL
%20PDF.pdf ﬁrst accessed 26 September 2014 and J-
M Sainsard and C Noblet, “France Introduces Radical
Labour Market Reforms” Squire and Sanders, avail-
able from and http://www.squiresanders.com/ﬁles/
Publication/5fdc90a3-c1d2-4c6a-b71d-
ab4fc7429426/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
0fbce787-35f0-4c05-becd-b2a7e4620235/France-In-
troduces-Radical-Labour-Market-Reforms-Newsletter.
pdf, ﬁrst accessed 26 September 2014.
95. I MacNeil, “The Trajectory of Regulatory Reform
in the UK in the Wake of the Financial Crisis” (2010)
11 Eur Business Organisation L Rev 483, 484.
96. H Chung and S Thewissen, “Falling Back on Old
Habits? A Comparison of the Social and Unemploy-
ment Crisis Reactive Policy Strategies in Germany,
the UK and Sweden” (2011) 45(4) Social Policy & Ad-
ministration 354, 358 & 362.
97. B Vis, K van Kersbergen and T Hylands, “To
What Extent Did the Financial Crisis Intensify the
Pressure to Reform the Welfare State?” (2011) 45(4)
Social Policy & Administration 338-353, 347.
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relating to combined protective characteristics and third party harassment on the
grounds that they are perceived as burdens on business. The duty on public au-
thorities to have regard to the need to reduce socio-economic inequalities has been
repealed (although it also never entered into force) and the duty on large em-
ployers to publish details of the gender pay gap is not being implemented.98 It
did, however, initiate measures in response to rising unemployment amounting
to incentives for employers to hire long term unemployed and funding
programmes aimed at getting the unemployed back to work.99
The most signiﬁcant reforms to insolvency law in the United Kingdom in the
most recent past occurred just after the turn of the millennium and modiﬁed the
Insolvency Act 1986 by replacing certain of its provisions with new sections and
schedules aimed at improving rescue procedures in terms of efﬁciency, beneﬁt
and practical use.100 The revised administration procedure has had arguably the
most signiﬁcant effect on the UK rescue culture as it went further to protect unse-
cured creditors and was implemented despite the resistance of banks, ﬁnancial in-
stitutions and other primary lenders who had beneﬁtted from the exclusive control
that administrative receivership had allowed.101 Administration presents three hi-
erarchical objectives with a bias toward rescuing the company as a going con-
cern.102 Administration has been supplemented with a non-statutory practice of
pre-packs that offer a pre-insolvency type of mechanism that functions on the pre-
mise of a pre-packaged sale by an administrator on terms that have been agreed
before the administration is commenced, but that is carried out shortly after the
appointment of an administrator.103 The company voluntary arrangement104
and scheme of arrangement105 provide two other upstream mechanisms for agree-
ing to compositions with creditors and debt restructuring. Thus there are a num-
ber of options for up-stream and rescue procedures in the UK, providing a
means of preserving business and, by association, employment.
The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act of 2013106 introduced reforms
aimed at reducing legislative burdens in a number of areas, including employment
and insolvency law. In addition, more recent reforms have been introduced in re-
lation to the regulation of insolvency practitioners,107 and the deregulation of cer-
tain areas of employment and labour law,108 although not all of the provisions
under these new acts are as yet in force. The impact of these reforms demonstrates
98. B Hepple, “Back to the Future: Employment Law
under the Coalition Government” (2013) 42(3) ILJ
223, 207.
99. H Chung and S Thewissen (n96) 363.
100. Enterprise Act 2002 c.40.
101. The Enterprise Act 2002 curtailed the availability
of administrative receivership, while retaining some
signiﬁcant carve-outs. It could be initiated by a ﬂoating
charge holder holding security over all or most of the
company’s assets through which it could appoint an
administrative receiver to act on their behalf to exer-
cise their security rights, putting them in control of
the company assets and generally leading to liquidation
and low to no returns for other creditors.
102. P Omar and JLL Gant, “Corporate Rescue in the
UK: Ten Years after the Enterprise Act 2002 Re-
forms” (2014) (forthcoming)
103. D Ereira, “UK Restructuring and Insolvency
Law: Current and Future Trends” (2010) April Practi-
cal Law Publishing Limited 23–29.
104. Part I of the Insolvency Act 1986 c. 45.
105. Section 895 of the Companies Act 2006 c. 46
106. C. 24
107. The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment
Act 2015, c. 26.
108. The Deregulation Act 2015, c. 20.
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the deregulatory emphasis espoused by the current Conservative government and
their overall focus on increasing freedom within the economy by reducing legisla-
tive restrictions. It follows that the employment protection regime in the UK does
not provide a high level of protection that can be depended upon in insolvency
situations.
The UK has recently undertaken to comply only minimally with EU obligations
for worker protection going forward and will be seeking to renegotiate its member-
ship in the EU in the near future, a process that will no doubt seek to curtail the
interference the EU has had in UK policy matters. Conditions governing eco-
nomic dismissals have been softened and thresholds loosened in order to increase
labour market ﬂexibility, making it easier for businesses to lay off workers.109 In
particular, it has reduced the consultation period for collective dismissals from
90 to 45days for redundancies of more than 100 employees and now excludes
ﬁxed term contracts that have reached their agreed termination date from collec-
tive redundancy obligations.110 There have also been reduced protections under
the transfer of undertakings regulations: contractual conditions can now be more
easily altered; dismissals are no longer automatically unfair for changes in work-
place; collective agreements can be renegotiated a year after the transfer; and it
is now more difﬁcult to satisfy the criteria of a service provision change.111 While
transfer of undertakings rules will not apply to transfers occurring with a view to
liquidation, they will be implicated in most corporate rescue procedures.
Employees in the UK do, however, retain a status of preferential creditors. Un-
paid wages and accrued holiday pay are given preferential priority in a distribution
in advance of unsecured claims out of the assets of the company, although such
claims are limited in amount.112 Employees are also able to claim against the state
National Insurance Fund in respect of a number of limited unpaid debts associated
with their employment. Unpaid employee pension contributions are also preferen-
tial for up to four months. Unpaid employer pension contributions are also prefer-
ential, but limited.113
6. Greece
Greece took steps in line with the protective function of labour law during the ini-
tial stages of the crisis; however, its approach changed completely once its MoU
came into effect.114 The austerity measures imposed by the MoU have had a se-
vere impact on its welfare system.115 The overall goals of the MoU were to
109. M Magone, “Portugal” (2009) 48 Eur J Pol Res
1080, 1081.
110. B Hepple (n98) 203, 207-208.
111. ACAS “ 2014 Changes to TUPE” (2014) Ref
AL20 available from http://www.acas.org.uk/media/
pdf/l/1/9908-2901767-TSO-ACAS-
TUPE_is_changing-ACCESSIBLE.pdf ﬁrst accessed
26 September 2014.
112. This is limited to an individual maximum of £800
as set out in Schedule 6 to the Insolvency Act 1986.
113. PM Secunda (n73) 867, 995-997.
114. C Papadimitriou, “The Greek Labour Law Face
to the Crisis: A Dangerous Passage Towards a New Ju-
ridical Nature” (2013) European Labour Law Network
– Working Paper Series, ELLN Working Paper 3/
2013 4.
115. C Dimoulas, “Exploring the Impact of Employ-
ment Policy Measures in the Context of Crisis: The
Case of Greece” (2014) Volume 67 Issue 2 International
Social Security Review 49-65, 49–55.
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eliminate ﬁscal imbalances by achieving ﬁscal surpluses; to improve competitive-
ness; and to improve liquidity for Greece until its return to the ﬁnancial mar-
kets.116 In order to do this, it was expected that wages would be lowered.117 The
structural reforms to labour law were undertaken on the premise that labour mar-
ket regulation constituted a signiﬁcant barrier to growth. Prior to the crisis, there
had been signiﬁcant resistance to any ﬂexibilisation of the labour market. By the
time of the crisis, Greece had some of the strictest employment protection legisla-
tion in the EU.118 In counterpoint to Greece’s previously extremely employee
friendly policies, the austerity policies applied under its MoU are among the most
severe ﬁscal austerity packages in Europe since the end of the Second World
War.119 Employment remains highly fragile in those economies that have been
subject to austerity measures and where business restructuring and its effect on
job security is an ongoing reality.120
Following the introduction of austerity measures in Greece, signiﬁcant changes
were made to reduce the costs of hiring and ﬁring employees.121 Greek law does
not require the employer to justify the dismissal of an employee as a potentially
fair reason, although this was mitigated prior to the crisis with generous sever-
ance packages, rendering the labour system practically inﬂexible. Following the
crisis, notiﬁcation periods were signiﬁcantly reduced, thereby reducing the poten-
tial for severance compensation, and therefore the cost of dismissal.122 While
justiﬁed in the name of competitiveness, these changes also promote the adoption
of a short term solution for reducing costs via dismissals, rather than pursuing
longer term strategies, undermining employment security.123 These changes
have also made it easier to reduce the workforce in times of insolvency or
restructuring.
Prior to the reforms of 2007, 124 however, Greece lacked any kind of sophisti-
cated corporate rescue regime. Rather, its insolvency system was geared toward
liquidation and historically resembling the French insolvency system. The new
law aimed to update an outdated system by introducing radical changes to the
Greek insolvency philosophy, providing for the rescue of ailing companies and of-
fering a second chance to insolvent debtors. However, the procedures introduced
were not adequate because of their consensual aspect, which was difﬁcult because
of a tradition of distrust in bankruptcy, a lack of cram-down in the agreements be-
tween debtor and creditors that made agreement difﬁcult, and its lengthy
116. S Zartaloudis, “The Impact of the Fiscal Crisis on
Greek and Portuguese Welfare States: Retrenchment
before the Catch-up?” (2014) Volume 48 Issue 4 Social
Policy and Administration 430-449, 438.
117. C Papadimitriou (n110) 8.
118. AKoukiadaki and L Krestos, “Opening Pandora’s
Box: The Sovereign Debt Crisis and Labour Market
Regulation in Greece” (2012) 41(3) ILJ 276, 278-280.
119. C Hadjmichalis, “Uneven Geographical Develop-
ment and Socio Spatial Justice and Solidarity:
European Regions after the 2009 Financial Crisis”
(2011) 18 European Urban and Regional Studies 268.
120. A Muller, “Employment Protection Legislation
Tested by the Economic Crisis: A Global Review of
the Regulation of Collective dismissals for Economic
Reasons” (2011) International Labour Ofﬁce, Dia-
logue in Brief No. 3.
121. C Dimoulas (n111) 56.
122. C Papadimitriou (n110) 9.
123. AKoukiadaki and L Krestos, “Opening Pandora’s
Box: The Sovereign Debt Crisis and Labour Market
Regulation in Greece” (2012) 41(3) ILJ 286-287.
124. Law 3588/2007 enacted on 10 July 2007.
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administrative process. In addition, procedures were often abused by debtors as a
means of securing a moratorium.125 In 2011, a new law was passed which intro-
duced a cram-down and a pre-bankruptcy procedure for companies in a state of
ﬁnancial weakness. A moratorium can also be put into place through a preliminary
order by the court after an application for rehabilitation proceedings has been
received.126
While the new procedures were a clear improvement, they also have serious ob-
stacles to overcome in order for it to make any signiﬁcant contribution to rescuing
companies, saving jobs and maximising value for the ﬁnancially distressed debtor
company’s stakeholders overall. Access to the procedure is restricted to companies
just on the verge of insolvency and that have perhaps already gone too far down
the river to be rescued. The process is also still overly dependent on the Greek ju-
dicial system. While a pre-pack style of procedure is available in Greece, it re-
quired a number of months and contested hearings under Greek procedural
requirements. Greek business culture is also an issue given that the success of a res-
cue proceeding depends on a residual trust and good faith among the debtor and
its stakeholders. Greek business culture tends to be suspicious of these processes,
viewing them as a prelude to default and often precipitating damaging responses
from suppliers and banks. The abuse of the previous system does not help in this
negative view.127
In terms of employee entitlements in insolvency, employee claims rank third in
preference. Greek employees can also access a Fund for the Protection of Em-
ployees from Employer’s Non-Reliability for the protection of wage claims not cov-
ered by their employers. Transfer of undertakings legislation, however, does not
apply to those transfers occurring out of insolvency procedures with a view to liq-
uidation, although they will likely apply in business transfers in the context of cor-
porate rescue. Rules on collective redundancies were amended by a law of 2010
that raised the collective dismissals from four to six employees dismissed in enter-
prises with more than 20 employees and from 2 to 5% of employees in enterprises
employing more than 150 people.128 It should be noted that this is still far more
protective than the minimum requirements in the Collective Redundancies Direc-
tive.129 Thus, despite the changes applied to its collective redundancy regime,
Greece remains highly protective in those circumstances relative to other EU
Member States,130 although the new bail-out agreement approved in July 2015
by the Greek Parliament with the country’s sovereign creditors may see additional
reductions in Greece’s socially protective stance. However, given the internal tur-
moil that is ongoing in this autumn of 2015, it is unclear what will happen with
Greece’s position in the Eurozone in the months to come.
125. S. Potamitis and A Rokas, “A New Pre-Bank-
ruptcy Procedure for Greece” (2012) 3 JBL 235-247,
235–237.
126. Ibid., 237–241.
127. Ibid., 246–247.
128. A Muller (n116) 4; C Dimoulas (n111) 54; and A
Koukiadaki and L Krestos (n119) 287.
129. Directive 98/59/CE of 1998 on the approxima-
tion of the laws of the Member States relating to collec-
tive redundancies, OJ L 225/16.
130. C Dimoulas (n111) 54.
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7. Portugal
Prior to its bail-out, Portugal had the most rigid employment protection laws in the
EU.131 Among developed nations it ranked last in terms of labour freedom132 and
it has been asserted that such rigidity has impaired ﬁrm performance.133 While join-
ing the Euro did have the effect of impairing Portugal’s ability to provide cheap prod-
ucts to the European market because of the levelling effect of the common currency,
its highly rigid and protective labour system were also at the root of Portugal’s com-
petitiveness problem, but this is also an inherently political issue.134 As early as 2005,
austerity measures had been enacted to combat an impending ﬁnancial crisis that
had been threatening since joining the EMU.135 Additional emergency austerity
measures were introduced at various stages as a result of continued market pressure
until Portugal was also forced to resort to the troika for assistance, agreeing to its own
MoU and implementing cuts that went well beyond those suggested therein.136
The MoU speciﬁcally targeted several areas in need of labour reform: reduction
of long term unemployment and strengthening social protections; reform of the
employment protection legislation in order to combat the segmentation of the la-
bour market and to facilitate the movement of workers between professions, mar-
kets and sectors; improve ﬂexibility of working time rules in order to ﬁt the needs
of peak business times and thus augment the competitiveness of Portuguese busi-
nesses; to connect the costs of labour with effective job creation; and to approve
legislation that serves to augment the employability of youth and of other tradition-
ally disadvantaged categories of workers.137 A new labour code entered into force
on 1 August 2012 that attempted to integrate the changes required in the MoU,
against a ﬂurry of cries disputing the constitutionality of the reforms, which were
summarily ignored by the government in power.138
Prior to the reforms to the Portuguese labour code, the Portuguese Constitution
prohibited dismissals without a just cause. It was practically impossible to dismiss
an employee who had not behaved in an illicit or deviant manner having such
gravity that it effectively destroyed the employment relationship.139 Following
the introduction of the new labour code in 2012, there has been an extension in
the concepts of unsuitability and the extinction of worker positions in order to
make individual dismissals easier. An employer can now establish non-discrimina-
tory criteria for dismissals, drawing Portugal’s redundancy rules in line with what
131.GBragues, “Portugal’s Plight: TheRole of Social De-
mocracy” (2012) 16(3) The Independent Rev 325, 338-339.
132. JA Vasconcellos, Portuguese Institute for Economic Free-
dom <http://institutoliberdadeeconomica.blogspot.co.
uk/> accessed 24 September 2014.
133. PS Martins, “Dismissals for Cause: The Differ-
ences that just Eight Paragraphs can Make” (2009)
27 J Labour Economics 257.
134. G Bragues (n127) 339.
135. S Zartaloudis (n112) 437–443.
136. Ibid., 437–443.
137. AP Nascimento, “ RELACIONES LABORALES
Y REGULACIÓN DE LOS SISTEMAS DE
PREVISIÓN SOCIAL: A Reforma Laboral em Portu-
gal” (2012) Actualidad Jurídica Uría Menéndez. Espe-
cial reformas estructurales, 47–61 <http://www.uria.
com/documentos/publicaciones/3603/documento/
a5.pdf?id=4410> accessed 15 August 2014, 48.
138. “Controversial New Labour Code Comes into
Force” European Industrial Relations Observatory
Online, <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2012/
05/articles/pt1205019i.htm> accessed 26 September
2014.
139. AP Nascimento (n133) 50.
International Insolvency Review22
Copyright © 2015 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd Int. Insolv. Rev. (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/iir
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
currently exists in the UK. Employers are also no longer obliged to offer a transfer
to another suitable position when dismissing an employee for either unsuitability or
the extinction of his job.140
The MoU also recommended changes to the Portuguese insolvency procedure,
which was based in the German Insolvenzplan which was available only if the com-
pany was insolvent.141 Portuguese legislators introduced reforms in 2012 that
added a new hybrid proceeding to the insolvency plan aimed only at pre-insol-
vency situations available to those companies facing economic difﬁculties or in
an imminent insolvency situation.142 Since its implementation, the new
revitalisation procedure has seemed popular among a number of different
debtors.143 There are, however, certain weaknesses in this new procedure. While
it is advantageous that the restructuring can now be carried out without the com-
pany being declared insolvent, in the event that negotiations do not arrive at an
equitable solution, the company then risks being declared insolvent and submitted
to the opening of proceedings.144 Part of the problem here is a cultural suspicion of
debt and insolvency. If the debtor is unable to satisfy the creditors that any com-
promises made will be worth it, those creditors might well initiate insolvency pro-
ceedings in order to protect themselves from what they may view as an untenable
or even unscrupulous process.145
Prior to reforms, the system governing collective redundancies in Portugal was
rigid, requiring veriﬁcation of the reasons for the dismissals and strict formal proce-
dures.146 More ﬂexible redundancy legislation has been introduced affecting the
costs of lay-offs and other measures to reduce the ﬁnancial burden on undertakings.
Eligibility and qualiﬁcation periods have been amended, providing more scope for
worker dismissal, and redundancy beneﬁts have been reduced. In addition, Portu-
gal has introduced an “employers’ compensation fund” to ﬁnance redundancy ben-
eﬁts.147 Wage claims in Portugal also receive priority under the Portuguese
Bankruptcy Code and certain guarantees regarding various labour payments in in-
solvency.148 The Portuguese transfer of undertakings legislation will also apply to all
transfers, including those occurring in the context of insolvency or rescue.
E. Conclusion: convergence or natural selection?
This treatise has attempted to showcase the effects of the ﬁnancial crisis in the US
and the EU, with a particular focus on Germany, France, the UK, Greece and
140. “Controversial New Labour Code Comes into
Force” European Industrial Relations Observatory
Online, <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/
2012/05/articles/pt1205019i.htm> accessed 26 Sep-
tember 2014.
141. AP Matos Martinas and MJ Andrade Campos,
“Portugal” Chapter 3 in C Mallon (ed), The Restructuring
Review (Law Business Research Ltd 2010) 276-277.
142. C Serra, “The Rescue of Large Corporations-
How Suitable is the Portuguese Insolvency Act?”
(2013) in R Parry (dd.), Papers from the INSOL Europe Ac-
ademic Forum / Nottingham Law School Joint International
Insolvency Conference, Nottingham Trent University, Notting-
ham, United Kingdom, 28 & 29 June 2012, 2013, 97–99.
143. Ibid., 24-25.
144. Ibid., 97-99.
145. C Serra, “Country Reports: Portugal – the New
Portuguese Insolvency Act” (2012) 47 EuroFenix – The
Journal of INSOL Europe 40.
146. AP Nascimento (n133) 50.
147. S Clauwaert and I Schomann, “The Crisis and
National Labour Law Reforms” (2012) Working Paper
2012.04 European Trade Union Institute 12–13.
148. PM Secunda (n73) 983-984.
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Portugal as examples of Member States diversely affected and responding to it and
whether this has shown any elements of convergence. An examination of country
speciﬁc responses and whether legislative reform in social policy and corporate res-
cue formed a part of that response demonstrates how a Member State’s socio-po-
litical perspective, traditional values and regulatory style inﬂuence legislative
responses. It is interesting to note as well that individual US states were also di-
versely affected by the ﬁnancial crisis, but that they were uniﬁed under a single ﬁs-
cal policy that restricted any opportunity for individual responses. EU Member
States, however, are not bound by a single ﬁscal policy that allows direct interfer-
ence with Member State economies, despite the uniﬁcation under the EMU. As
evidence suggests that the US is recovering more quickly than the EU, and that
the UK is recovering faster than the EMU, it could be surmised that the inability
of the EU to make direct changes in ﬁscal policies of Member States because of its
character as a loose constitutional federation with extremely diffuse power, may
play a part in the EU’s slow recovery and pending stagnation. The nature of the
EU precludes any increase in direct interference, however. So perhaps the prob-
lem lies with the institutional structure itself.
The scope given to Member States in the implementation of social policy direc-
tives and the way in which they have been implemented demonstrate the differ-
ences in individual Member State systems of labour and employment law. There
are strong path dependencies in labour law, which is true for individual Member
States and even individual states of America. These culturally and traditionally
grounded ideologies may hold lawmakers back from a uniform labour code on
an EU or US Federal level. Changes in the differences in worker protection are of-
ten motivated by political events, such as the responses to the ﬁnancial crisis in
both the US and the EU. In the US, worker protection remains a domestic issue
because of its federal structure and generally libertarian political ideology.149
Because of the MoUs in some Member States, the wish to avoid MoUs in
others, and the perception that austerity is the only way to achieve recovery, a be-
lief that has been summarily rebutted on several occasions by well known econo-
mists, there have indeed been signs of convergence toward a lowest common
denominator in the EU: the UK. Corporate rescue is also steadily converging to-
ward an EU wide rescue culture, although the ways and means that this is being
achieved differ. If we look at the fundamental differences between social and eco-
nomic policies and the legislation to which they relate, it is evident that economic
issues have far greater cross-border implications. So perhaps a legal natural selec-
tion is taking place in corporate rescue regimes, while social policy, without any
signiﬁcant cross-border element, remains inextricably bound up with tradition
and the socio-economic character of individual Member States.
While the power of the US Federal Government to legislate with regard to
bankruptcy law forms a part of the very ﬁrst Article of the Constitution, any federal
intervention in labour or employment have had to ﬁnd their justiﬁcation in clauses
149. M Siems (n26) 10.
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and amendments that may or may not provide enough muster to pass Supreme
Court analysis. This seems directly opposed to the way in which insolvency and so-
cial policy are regulated within the EU. The European Insolvency Regulation only
goes so far as to regulate in matters of cross-border insolvencies, while the social
chapter has given the EU wide powers to legislate in matters of employment and
labour regulation. While true that there the EU Commission has issued a recom-
mendation introducing a new approach to business failure and insolvency that
shifts the focus from liquidation to encouraging the early restructuring of viable
businesses,150 this is merely exhortation and an invitation to reform, non-binding
on the Member States. However, in areas of social policy, EU inﬂuence is far more
heavily felt, despite the fact that legislation is only in the form of Directives, which
are binding only to the achievement of the intended results.
While rule of law and historic documents such as the US Constitution and the
EU Treaties are vital to the structure and integrity of the US and EU respectively,
these are also man-made documents, written during a certain period of time under
a certain set of circumstances. Time, circumstances and progress change. Why
should the documents and rules that jurisdictions adhere to not also be adjustable
in order to cope with the demands of the modern global marketplace and culture?
Since the 1950s the EU has frequently revised and renewed the rules that provide
for its governance and interaction with the Member States. The Constitution has
retained the perception of inviolability and is viewed by many as a kind of holy writ
that should not be interfered with under any circumstances, although twenty seven
amendments disagree with that proposition. This treatise began on the premise
that the EU might be able to learn something from the US; perhaps the learning
curve could bend both ways.
150. See theCommission Recommendation of 12.03.2014
on a new approach to business failure and insolvency
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